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THE ROLE AND FUTURE OF CUSTOMARY TORT LAW IN GHANA:  
A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 
 




Customary law, a set of established norms, practices, and usages derived 
from the lives of people,1 has thrived in Africa, and in Ghana in particular, for as 
long as anyone can remember.  For many Ghanaians, the rules governing topics 
such as family law and social relations, succession, and certain dignitary torts are 
as necessary as air yet just as imperceptible.  Indeed, customary law is embedded 
in and inseparable from the fundamental ethos and values of Ghanaian and other 
African societies.  The source of its legal validity is the cultural expression of the 
particular society where it is practiced.  Although under colonial rule customary 
law was sometimes questioned or even rejected by colonial courts, in modern 
Ghana it is recognized as part of the laws of the country in the Constitution of the 
Republic of Ghana (“1992 Constitution”).2  Yet Ghana, like many other countries 
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1. There are many efforts to define custom and customary law.  According to one 
source, “[c]ustom in general is essentially the perception of a way to behave and, as a 
source of law, a common perception of how to behave in accordance with the other 
members of society . . . . Custom is not word or writing; it is gesture.”  Jacques 
Vanderlinden, What Kind of Law Making in a Global World?  The Case of Africa, 67 LA. 
L. REV. 1043, 1065 (2007).  As a customary law expert, A. N. Allott explained that not all 
custom becomes customary law.  Custom is part of the “raw material out of which a 
customary norm is manufactured.”  A. N. ALLOTT, JUDICIAL AND LEGAL SYSTEMS IN AFRICA 
5 (1962).  Some authors prefer different terminology.  One author prefers the term 
“chthonic law.”  See H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 74–75 (3d ed. 
2007).  Because the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana refers to customary law, that is 
the terminology employed here. 
2. See GHANA CONST. art. 11(2)–(3).  
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in Africa, has experienced enormous changes due to globalization3 and 
urbanization.  It has absorbed the common law of England, its former colonizer.  
Its tort law reflects modern legal issues, such as vehicular negligence, that are 
resolved on the basis of British common law rules as accepted and adapted by 
Ghanaian courts.  However, Ghanaian tort law must also grapple with the 
inadequacy of the inherited British law to recognize and provide remedies for 
indigenously- and culturally-defined injuries.  A significant number of tort cases 
raise issues that implicate customary law, and the choice of that law4 by litigants 
makes a profound statement about the values of Ghanaian society and the role of 
law in preserving them.  This article considers both the role customary law has 
played in the past and whether customary tort law will play a significant role in 
the future.  Will it become a relic studied in legal history or anthropology classes, 
or will it continue to serve its unique role within Ghanaian society?  We believe 
its future is dependent on the desire of the Ghanaians to invoke its protections and 
embrace its values and on the ability of Ghanaian judges to rethink its meaning in 
a changing society. 
 For one of us, a native of Northern Ghana, this question about the future 
of Ghanaian customary tort law is far from academic.  It is a problem with which 
Ghanaian judges and jurists have been grappling for some time, and as the pace of 
development accelerates, the problem takes on greater meaning.  A period of 
study in the United States (U.S.) has served to focus attention on the role that 
customary tort law, as an expression of culture, plays in Ghanaian society and has 
provided the occasion to ponder its meaning from afar.  For the other of us, a 
native of the U.S. who has yet to visit Ghana, the role and future of customary tort 
law is an academic question, but a useful one.  It provides a unique lens through 
which we can re-examine well-accepted principles of U.S. common law torts, 
such as slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and even the rules of 
parental responsibility.  Though we bring different interests and perspectives to 
the issue, we are of the same mind in recognizing the continuing utility of 
Ghanaian customary tort law in the lives of many Ghanaians and in perceiving the 
values it reflects as worthy of consideration. 
 To appreciate and understand customary tort law in Ghana, we focus first 
on the role of customary law generally and its place in the Ghanaian legal and 
societal structure.  It is then possible to consider the subset of Ghanaian customary 
law dealing with what we recognize as tort principles.  Drawing on the work of 
noted Ghanaian judges, jurists, and scholars, we place customary tort law in the 
                                                
3. See Vanderlinden, supra note 1, at 1047 (stating that for more than a century 
Africans individually and collectively have borne the brunt of the impact of globalization, 
being subjected to the unilateral choices of European, and later, North American nations). 
4. Ghanaian decisions address choice of law issues that arise between the customary 
and the common law in some detail.  Generally, when the parties are Ghanaians, they may 
choose to have the dispute resolved under customary law.  See Nkrumah v. Manu, [1971] 1 
G.L.R. 176 (Ghana) (discussing choice of law issue). 
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context of similar tort law in the civil law tradition and also compare it to 
corresponding common law principles.  Finally, we consider the possible role of 
customary tort law in the future.  There are many factors that we believe will 
influence whether customary tort law flourishes or expires.  Some factors relate to 
broad societal forces and trends, such as the impact of religion, the availability of 
education, or migration of people from their traditional homelands.  The other part 
of the equation is people, including the chiefs who know, interpret, and apply 
customary law daily, and judges, who have occasion to view customary tort law as 
part of their case load and to consider where it fits in a modern society. 
Ultimately, though, the future of customary tort law rests on whether it continues 
to be accepted and practiced by the people of Ghana. 
 
 
II. THE CONTENT, SCOPE, AND ROLE OF GHANAIAN CUSTOMARY 
TORT LAW 
  
We begin this section by recounting the role of customary law in the 
lives of Ghanaians prior to and during colonization, and in the years since 
independence.  The legal status of customary law during these periods is of 
particular importance to gain an understanding of the role of customary law in 
modern Ghanaian society.  With that foundation, we progress to a full description 
of Ghanaian customary tort law.  To fully appreciate the similarities and 
differences between Ghanaian customary tort law and the approaches taken in 
other legal systems, we compare it with the principles that other systems use to 
address similar types of problems. 
 
 
A. History and Evolution of Ghanaian Customary Law 
 
Long before the formation of the modern country now known as Ghana, 
and long before the colonization of those lands by the British, there were well-
developed tribal or ethnic groups in the West African territories for whom custom 
was law.5  Linguistically and ethnically diverse, these populations lived by a set of 
rules particular and peculiar to their society and community, and the rules of any 
other tribe were foreign law.6  When the British began to install a central 
government, the concept of customary law, as distinguished from their own 
common law system, appeared for the first time.7  During this colonial period of 
approximately 140 years, the British recognized the force of African customary 
law, establishing a dual court system with some courts administering “general 
                                                
5. See N. A. Ollennu, The Changing Law and Law Reform in Ghana, 15 J. AFRICAN 
L. 132, 133 (1971).  
6. See id. 
7. See id. 
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law,” or the law they brought with them, and native and local courts administering 
primarily customary law.8  The Supreme Court of Ghana was empowered to 
enforce the customary law in cases where the parties were Africans if the law was 
“not . . . repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience,”9 or to any other 
enactment.10  In addition to this legal authority to veto particular aspects of 
customary law that they found repugnant, the British imposed various conditions 
on the applicability of customary law.  For example, although the courts were to 
give effect to native customs, they could only do so when the customs existed at 
the date of the passage of the Supreme Court Ordinance in 1876.11  Rules of 
customary law were treated as questions of fact, subject to re-litigation in each 
case; this ensured that any customary rule or practice could repeatedly be 
subjected to the repugnancy test.12  As Vanderlinden describes it, “[i]n order to 
become ‘civilized,’ Africans and their laws had to give up all mechanisms linked 
to the prevalence of social harmony for the benefit of the adjudicatory legal 
process favored in Europe.”13 
  In 1957, Ghana gained independence from the British colonial 
administration.  In 1960, the newly formed country of Ghana designated issues of 
customary law as questions of law for the court, not questions of fact,14 and 
enacted a constitution that promptly eliminated the “repugnancy clause.”  Casting 
off the British attempt to solidify customary law, the Courts Act provided that if a 
court had any doubt as to the existence or content of customary law in any 
proceedings, the judge could, after reviewing cases, textbooks, and other sources, 
adjourn the proceedings to consult with persons possessing knowledge of the 
customary law.15  In these ways, the Republic of Ghana sought to reclaim and 
preserve its customary law. 
 However, by the time of independence, Ghana, like other Anglophonic 
African countries, had absorbed or “received” English law.  Statutes had been 
enacted locally to apply to Ghana, and many “received” English statutes were in 
force as well.  In addition, there was “received” English common law, 
supplemented by local judicial precedent.16  All post-independence constitutions 
have continued this dual legal system consisting of enacted statutes and 
regulations, common law decisions of the Ghanaian courts, and customary law.  
                                                
8. See ALLOTT, supra note 1, at 20. 
9. See Supreme Court Ordinance, 1876, § 19 (Ghana). 
10. See id.  
11. See W. C. Ekow-Daniels, Development of Customary Law, 18 REV. GHANA L. 68 
(1991–1992). 
12. See id. 
13. Vanderlinden, supra note 1, at 1048. 
14. See Ekow-Daniels, supra note 11; see generally Courts Act, 1993, § 55(1) 
(Ghana).  
15. See Courts Act § 55(2). 
16. See C. Ogwurike, The Source and Authority of African Customary Law, 3 U. 
GHANA L.J. 11 (1966). 
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The 1992 Constitution, Ghana’s most recent, states that the laws of Ghana 
comprise various sources, including the current constitution itself, statutes enacted 
by Parliament, and the common law.17  The rules of customary law, defined as 
“the rules of law which by custom are applicable to particular communities in 
Ghana,” are part of the common law of Ghana.18   
 The scope and content of customary law in Ghana is very broad.  S.Y. 
Bimpong-Buta called customary law “the living embodiment of the country’s 
cultural heritage.”19  The late Chief Justice, George Kingsley Acquah, described it 
well, stating: 
 
Ghana, like most nations, is made up of a number of ethnic 
communities, each with its own deep-rooted customary practices 
and offences handed down from generation to generation. . . . 
Some of the customary practices and offences are related to the 
history of the founding fathers of the community, others to 
particular incidents in the lifetime of the people, others to 
marriage and puberty rites of the women, and others to the day 
to day life in the community.20 
 
Customary law possesses a number of characteristic traits including 
flexibility, popularity, adaptability, and a communal focus.  Because customary 
law reflects the practices of the people, it has the capacity to change, and thus to 
avoid the fossilization that characterizes some civil codes.21  The fact that 
customary law is unwritten enhances its adaptability.  Its popularity is vital to its 
survival; when a group stops following a practice, it loses force.22    
 Despite social, economic, political, and external influences and 
pressures, the essential features of customary law remain intact because the law 
has been instrumental in maintaining the social equilibrium among groups related 
by kinship.23  Unlike the U.S. or Europe, where criminal law occupies a large role 
in maintaining social order,24 customary law serves much of that function in 
                                                
17. See GHANA CONST. art. 11(1). 
18. See id. art. (11)(3).  Article 26(1) entitles every person “to enjoy, practise, 
profess, maintain and promote any culture, language, tradition, or religion subject to the 
provisions of th[e] Constitution.”  Id. art. 26(1). 
19. See Seth Yeboa Bimpong-Buta, Sources of Law in Ghana, 15 REV. GHANA L. 
129, 129 (1983–1986).  The matters covered by these customary practices include the 
acquisition of rights in land and matters involving family relationships, such as husbands 
and wives, parents and children, marriage and divorce, and chieftaincy.  See id. 
20. G. K. Acquah, Customary Offences and the Courts, 18 REV. GHANA L. 36, 36 
(1991–1992). 
21. See Ekow-Daniels, supra note 11.  
22. See id. 
23. See id.  
24. See Vanderlinden, supra note 1, at 1048. 
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countries where it is used.25  This use of customary law underscores the dual and 
plural nature of African law.  At the traditional level, society does not prosecute or 
punish an offender, but the initiation of a complaint brings to the forefront not 
only the individual’s interest, but also the collective interest in addressing conduct 
that may disrupt the “necessary harmony that society needs to survive.”26  
Remedies may range from apologies to compensation.27  This communal focus is 
evident in the Ghanaian customary tort law. 
Although Ghanaians rejected the assertion that colonial courts should tell 
them when customary law was “repugnant to natural justice, equity and good 
conscience,” they recognized that there might be a need to prune their own 
customary law rules if they were outmoded or against public policy.  This is done 
in several ways.  The 1992 Constitution states that “[a]ll customary practices 
which dehumanise or are injurious to the physical and mental well-being of a 
person are prohibited.”28  It established the National House of Chiefs and the 
Regional House of Chiefs and requires these institutions to study, interpret, and 
compile customary laws with the goal of eliminating customs and usages that are 
“outmoded and socially harmful.”29  In addition, a Law Reform Commission was 
founded that has the power to propose new laws or changes in the existing law.30  
The work of that Commission resulted in the enactment of the Intestate 
Succession Law,31 which sought to unify the law relating to intestate succession 
because various ethnic regions previously followed different succession rules.32  
Finally, the Ghanaian courts themselves have at times held a custom to be 
contrary to statute or natural justice.  For example, in one case, appellants were 
charged with the criminal offense of cremating a corpse without lawful 
authority.33  They asserted as one ground of defense that the custom in the locality 
required that the deceased, who had violated a custom but was not purified before 
death, should be cremated rather than afforded a burial.  Although the head of 
family and paramount chief gave evidence testifying to the custom and the 
appellants appeared genuinely to believe they had done no wrong, the court 
upheld their conviction, finding the custom outmoded and contrary to public 
                                                
25. Criminal law is also an essential part of their legal systems, but private resolution 
of disputes among individuals and their family groups can avoid engagement of the 
criminal process. 
26. See Vanderlinden, supra note 1, at 1048.  
27. See id.  
28. GHANA CONST. art. 26(2). 
29. See id. arts. 272(b)–(c), 274(3)(f). 
30. See Law Reform Commission Decree, 1975, N.R.C.D. 325, § 2 (Ghana).  
31. See Intestate Succession Law, 1985, P.N.D.C.L. 111 (Ghana). 
32. This change was intended to more fully protect the interests of spouses, 
particularly widows.  See Jeanmarie Fenrich & Tracy E. Higgins, Promise Unfulfilled: 
Law, Culture, and Women’s Inheritance Rights in Ghana, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 259, 268 
(2001). 
33. See Foli VIII v. The Republic, [1968] G.L.R. 768 (Ghana). 
 The Role and Future of Customary Tort Law in Ghana: A Cross-Cultural Perspective 309 
 
 
health rules that required the permission of a medical officer before setting fire to 
a dead body.   
 
 
B. A Description of Customary Tort Law in Ghana 
  
Ghanaian customary tort law, like other areas of customary law, serves 
the purpose of maintaining social equilibrium by redressing injuries that may be 
individual or collective in nature.  The injuries that would most disrupt the societal 
balance are those that interfere with familial relationships.  The Ghanaian family 
is regarded as the basic unit and foundation of society, and its stability and 
cohesion is essential for the organization, productivity, and indeed, survival of the 
individual and the larger community.34  Professor W.C. Ekow-Daniels notes that 
from the standpoint of customary law, the family is a collective or corporate unit 
that remains undiminished by the death of its members.35  Customary torts may 
threaten this ongoing genealogical unit, rupturing the bond among its members or 
the social order between families.  If members of the family are impugned through 
insults, abusive language or words injurious to reputation, or if family bonds and 
promises are broken through such actions as the customary tort of seduction, the 
essence of the family’s identity and its place within society are placed in question.  
This is one reason customary torts are taken so seriously.  Ghanaian customary 
tort law, however, provides more than a deterrent to disruptive social behavior.  
Inherent in the concept of a broad and highly cohesive family is the acceptance of 
unwavering responsibility for one’s family members and thus a notion of parental 
liability that is more expansive than normally found in a common law system.36 
This focus on the group and customary law’s protection of the collective 
interests in Ghana is best understood by recognizing that every culture falls in a 
different place on the continuum between individualism and collectivism.  As 
Jeanne M. Brett explains: 
 
                                                
34. The downside to a society based on kinship and solidarity is that when conflict 
arises among individuals, it always carries the risk of escalating to pit one group against 
another.  This is the reason that traditional African societies exercised great care to contain 
individual conflicts and prevent them from escalating.  See GEORGE B. N. AYITTEY, 
INDIGENOUS AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS 9 (1991). 
35. See Ekow-Daniels, supra note 11.  A consecrated stool or skin is the corporate 
seal of the family, in which the souls of the deceased members are believed to reside.  All 
legal title to the family’s property is vested in the stool or the skin itself, and never in the 
occupant of the stool or skin, for these are merely temporary custodians of the family’s 
assets.  See id. 
36. See Frances M. Deng, The Family and the Law of Torts in African Customary 
Law, 4 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 1−2 (1966) (discussing the concept of justice that requires family 
members to answer for the torts of another). 
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[This continuum] distinguishes between cultures that generally 
place individuals’ interests above those of the collective and 
cultures that generally place collective needs above those of 
individuals.  In individualist cultures social, economic, and legal 
institutions promote the autonomy of individuals, reward 
individual accomplishment, and protect individual rights.  In 
collective cultures institutions promote interdependency of 
individuals with the others in their families, work 
establishments, and communities by emphasizing social 
obligations.  Individual accomplishment [as well as failure] 
reflects back on others with whom the individual is 
interdependent.  Legal institutions support collective interests 
above individual interests.37 
 
The collective focus of society in Ghana is reinforced by the descent system, 
which categorizes individuals into lineages, families, and clans.38  Given Ghanaian 
society’s corporate and collective character, it follows that customary tort law in 
Ghana would focus on the group.  In collective cultures, collective interests 
generally take precedence over self-interests although people from collective 
cultures also have self-interests that are important and protected.39  
Before describing Ghanaian customary tort law in greater depth, it is 
useful to place it in the context of the tort law of other legal systems that similarly 
offer redress for dignitary and family torts that fall outside the protection of the 
common law.  As the Ghanaian jurist S.K. Date-Bah observed, “customary law is 
not alone in providing a remedy against insult and affronts to personal dignity and 
                                                
37. JEANNE M. BRETT, NEGOTIATING GLOBALLY: HOW TO NEGOTIATE DEALS, 
RESOLVE DISPUTES, AND MAKE DECISIONS ACROSS CULTURAL BOUNDARIES 32–33 (2d ed.  
2007).  
38. Descent is the process by which a “direct genealogical connection is traced 
between an individual and his forbearers or offspring for the purpose of recruitment into 
kin groups.”  G. K. NUKUNYA, TRADITION AND CHANGE IN GHANA: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
SOCIOLOGY 19 (2d ed. 2003).  There are two main descent groups: clans and lineages.  A 
clan is “a group of people, male and female, who are believed to have descended through 
one line only (male or female) from a common putative ancestor or ancestress.”  Id.  A 
lineage is “a group of people, male and female, who are descended through one line only 
from a common ancestor or ancestress.”  Id. at 21.  The lineage is a segment of the clan 
found in one locality.  Thus, the difference between a clan and a lineage is that members of 
lineage “are localized and know the genealogical ties that connect them to their founding 
ancestor or ancestress.”  Id.; see also Kojo Yelpaala, Western Anthropological Concepts in 
Stateless Societies: A Retrospective and Introspective Look at the Dagaaba, 17 
DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 431, 446–47 (1992) (explaining these concepts in more 
detail). 
39. See BRETT, supra note 37. 
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. . . it is no sign of backwardness for it to provide such a remedy.”40  First, 
Ghanaian customary tort law is similar to the customary tort law of certain other 
African countries, such as Nigeria, Uganda, and Kenya to mention a few.41  It 
stands to reason that the underlying social structure and the practices that reinforce 
it would be similar; the borders and institutions of the modern state are fairly 
recent and artificial divisions.  Second, under Roman law, the form of delict called 
iniuria protected people from insults.42  Iniuria had a much broader scope than 
providing redress for defamation.43  Roman law spread through Europe and the 
British Isles and, eventually, to South Africa, where it became part of the 
“received” law.  Roman-Dutch law includes protection of various types of 
individual feelings, providing greater remedies for injury than the common law.44  
European civil law provides a final example of broader protection for 
dignity and feelings than the common law affords.  While Roman law was 
replaced with customary law when the Roman Empire fell, it “came crashing 
back” into Europe during the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries.45  
Eventually, the civil law tradition emerged in Europe, as exemplified by the 
Napoleonic Code in France.46  The Code included criminal defamation laws that 
are still in effect and serve largely to protect members of the government from 
insult.47  French law recognizes a distinction between injure, which protects from 
insult and outrage, and diffimation, which protects reputation.48  The influential 
French Code spurred other countries to adopt similar codes, some broader than the 
French, criminalizing insults.49  These laws included protection of royal families 
and national symbols from dishonor.50  Thus, numerous other countries impose 
either criminal or civil liability for insults as distinguished from defamation, 
                                                
40. S.K. Date-Bah, Reflections on the Law of Defamation in Ghana, [1973] 10 U. 
GHANA L.J. 129, 135. 
41. See, e.g., Jill Cottrell, The Functions of the Law of Torts in Africa, 31 J. AFRICAN 
L. 161, 164 n.26, 165, 177–179 (1987); T. Olawale Elias, Insult as an Offence in African 
Customary Law, 53 AFR. AFF. 66, 66 (1954). 
42. See ANDREW BORKOWSKI & PAUL DU PLESSIS, TEXTBOOK ON ROMAN LAW § 10.4 
(3d ed. 2005); see also Elena Yanchukova, Comment, Criminal Defamation and Insult 
Laws: An Infringement on the Freedom of Expression in European and Post-Communist 
Jurisdictions, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 861, 863 (2003).   
43. See Date-Bah, supra note 40, at 134–35. 
44. See CHITTHARANJAN FELIX AMERASINGHE, DEFAMATION AND OTHER ASPECTS OF 
THE ACTIO INIURIARUM IN ROMAN-DUTCH LAW 320–26 (1968); Cottrell, supra note 41, at 
165; Date-Bah, supra note 40. 
45. See GLENN, supra note 1, at 132. 
46. See Yanchukova, supra note 42. 
47. See id. 
48. See Date-Bah, supra note 40. 
49. See Yanchukova, supra note 42, 887–88. 
50. See id. 
312 Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law Vol. 26, No. 2 2009 
 
 
although the interests they seek to protect are different from those embodied in 
customary tort law in Ghana.51 
African customary tort law “rigorously discourages any conduct, whether 
by word or deed, that is likely to lead to a disturbance of the peace of the 
community.”52  Insults have the potential to trigger an explosive outbreak among 
people who live together in a very tight-knit society53 and, for that reason, they are 
taken very seriously.  Justice Sophia Akuffo of the Supreme Court of Ghana 
explained their significance in a criminal defamation case, stating that: 
 
[r]ecent events in certain parts of this country prove that our 
society is presently one in which expressions and allegations 
against persons, whether oral or written, can have far-reaching 
consequences (both as a result of the public acting upon the 
allegations or the accused person seeking to defend himself), 
including breach of the peace, mob action, mass hysteria and 
even loss of lives.  Allegations made against persons, whatever 
be their station in life, still have the potential power to cause 
immediate effect.54 
 
Ghanaian customary law reflects this view; courts have found the tort of 
slander applicable when a plaintiff is called a “witch,”55 “slave,”56 “prostitute,”57 
“useless fellow and a non-native of the town,”58 “mad woman,”59 and “hopeless 
lawyer and a hopeless M.P.”60  In one famous case, the plaintiff was told during an 
angry exchange that “her vagina stinks.”61  In another case, the plaintiff claimed 
damages because she was “hooted at in public in a Ghanaian village” by someone 
                                                
51. Increasingly the European Court of Human Rights has found the application of 
some of these laws problematic in light of these countries’ ratification of the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”).  See JULIE A. 
DAVIES & PAUL T. HAYDEN, GLOBAL ISSUES IN TORT LAW 245–52 (2008) (discussing 
impact of the European Court of Human Rights and its interpretation of the ECHR); see 
also Yanchukova, supra note  42, at 877–83 (discussing the landmark decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights). 
52. Elias, supra note 41. 
53. See id. 
54. Republic v. Tommy Thompson Books Ltd., [1997–1998] 1 G.L.R. 611, 644 
(Ghana). 
55. See Afriyie v. Dansowah, [1976] 2 G.L.R. 172 (Ghana); Abotchie v. Nuumo, 
[1974] 1 G.L.R. 142 (Ghana). 
56. See Nkrumah v. Manu, [1971] 1 G.L.R. 176 (Ghana); Ampong v. Aboraa, [1960] 
G.L.R. 29 (Ghana). 
57. See Serwah v. Sefa, [1984–1986] 2 G.L.R. 390 (Ghana). 
58. See Sogbaka v. Tamakloe, [1973] 1 G.L.R. 25 (Ghana). 
59. See Adjuah Attah v. Abbah Attah, [1961] G.L.R. 77 (Ghana). 
60. See Bonsu v. Forson, [1962] 1 G.L.R. 139 (Ghana). 
61. See Wankiyiwaa v. Wereduwaa, [1963] 1 G.L.R. 322 (Ghana). 
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alleging she had stolen money.62  While allegations of theft would, of course, 
impair reputation, it was clear that the grievance encompassed insult as much or 
more than injury to reputation.63 
These insults are taken seriously by judges, in large part because they 
may affect and damage the group to which the complainant belongs as much as, if 
not more than, the complainant individually.  Although under the common law 
many of these insults would fall beyond the reach of the law, due to Ghanaian 
culture and history, the words have a power to them that is as explosive as any 
slander per se.64  For example, witchcraft and wizardry are believed to be 
inherited65 and to signify a predisposition to harming others.  An allegation of 
slavery has negative implications for an entire ethnic group, signifying that they 
are not who they purport to be, or that they are not of good lineage, or that they 
are servants of a lower social status.66  This is true even though slavery has long 
been abolished.67  Accusations of prostitution or adultery implicate a family group 
because sexual relations outside of marriage, or in betrayal of one’s spouse, 
threaten the union that has been created between the families of the bride and the 
groom and bring shame on them.68  Physical traits, such as a lack of intelligence or 
talent, have an obvious bearing on one’s heredity and upbringing and, hence, may 
insult the collective from which the individual descends. 
Another form of customary tort liability arises when a wife or child is 
seduced to leave the family home.  While the torts of seduction and enticement 
have frequently been abolished in common law systems, Ghana retains both 
common law and customary law variants.69  The common law torts in Ghana 
protect the fairly narrow interest of the husband in the comfort and society of the 
enticed wife, or for the loss of her services.70  In contrast, the customary tort of 
seduction seeks to protect the integrity and moral character of the family of the 
parties involved.  In fact, one of the elements of the tort, in addition to proof that 
                                                
62. See Adai v. Kwabena, [1970] No. 30/67 Civ. (Ghana), discussed in Date-Bah, 
supra note 40. 
63. See id. 
64. The allegation that a woman is a prostitute would be slander per se, and 
actionable without special damages under the common law rules.  See infra note 83 and 
accompanying text. 
65. See Deng, supra note 36, at 23 (discussing the link between witchcraft and the 
family among the Dinka and the Nuer people). 
66. See Kwame Anthony Appiah, A Slow Emancipation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2007 
(discussing the continuing stigma of descent from slaves in the Ashanti region more than 
one hundred years after abolition of slavery). 
67. See GHANA CONST. art. 16(1).  
68. See generally Deng, supra note 36, at 4–11 (discussing the meaning of adultery 
in Africa). 
69. See L.K. Agbosu, Seduction Actions in Ghana: Benya v. Lawani, 16 REV. GHANA 
L. 171 (1987–1988). 
70. See id. 
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the victim of seduction left the home and suffered a wrong at the hands of the 
defendant, is that the incident brought disgrace on the family.71  From a policy 
perspective, the tort recognizes that by breaking the bonds of marriage through 
seduction, or by seducing an unmarried woman, a defendant is disrespecting the 
traditional norms, and undermining the institution of the family and the authority 
of parents and elders that sustain the health, unity, and cohesion of the family and 
society at large.72 
 Under principles of customary law, a father is liable for a son’s 
misconduct with a woman if the father has not obtained a wife for the son by the 
time the son has reached puberty.73  As explained by Justice Wiredu, who later 
became the Chief Justice of Ghana, the rule holding a father primarily liable for 
the immoral conduct of his son is based not only on the physical control exercised 
by a father over his son, but on the responsibility to give the son a moral 
upbringing and to make provisions for his future marriage.74  Justice Wiredu 
explains the principle as the complement to the customary tort of seduction; it 
would be unconscionable and strange to recognize a parent’s cause of action 
against the seducer of his unmarried daughter and “then exonerate him of 
reciprocal responsibility for the immoral conduct of his son.”75  To be sure, 
Wiredu recognized that in some cases a parent should escape liability,76 but he 
reaffirmed his belief in the correctness of the general liability principle.77 
 Ghana’s customary torts are differentiated not only by their broader-than-
common-law reach, but also by their remedies.  In customary law actions, the goal 
of the plaintiff is to restore his or her standing in the community and not to make 
money.  John Mensah Sarbah, a famous lawyer who wrote on Ghanaian 
customary law, described the remedies as consisting of public retraction in 
addition to payment of a small fine.  The confession of disgraceful behavior would 
                                                
71. See id. 
72. See id.  Agbosu suggests that given changes in Ghanaian society, at least in some 
urban areas, courts might update the elements of the customary law action for seduction if 
they ascertain that mores have changed.  See id. 
73. “Not only is a father liable to maintain his child, but if he fail [sic] to obtain a 
wife for his son on reaching the age of puberty, he is liable for damages arising from the 
son’s misconduct with any woman.”  Addae v. Asante, [1974] 2 G.L.R. 288, 291 (Ghana) 
(quoting JOHN MENSAH SARBAH, FANTI CUSTOMARY LAWS 39 (2d ed. 1904)). 
74. See Gyan v. Dabrah, [1974] 2 G.L.R. 318, 323–24 (Ghana). 
75. See id. 
76. See id.  To escape liability for the son or daughter’s misconduct, a parent must 
establish that the son or daughter has been emancipated out of boyhood, attained the age of 
manhood and is in control of his or her own affairs.  See id. 
77. See id.  This particular rule is perhaps best understood as part of a broader 
concept of family liability.  Membership in a family carries rights, such as common 
ownership of property and the right to sit in on family council meetings, as well as 
responsibilities, such as the obligation to discharge family debts.  See OLLENNU’S 
PRINCIPLES OF CUSTOMARY LAND LAW IN GHANA 149 (N.A. Ollennu & G.R. Woodman 
eds., 2d ed. 1985). 
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provoke jeers and sneers that were punishment enough for the offender.78  
Professor S.K. Date-Bah explains that because the fine is payable to the plaintiff, 




C. Comparison with U.S. Common Law Principles 
 
 In almost all respects except damages, Ghanaian customary tort law is 
broader and more encompassing than U.S. common law.81  The common law of 
torts suggests several avenues that might apply to the types of cases brought under 
customary law, the most relevant of which are slander and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.  Slander, though it descends from the broader Roman concept 
of iniuria,82 is not a tort that is easy to establish.  Although, under common law 
principles, slander is a strict liability tort, the requirement that the plaintiff prove 
special damages (pecuniary loss) in all but cases falling within the areas 
considered slander per se83 makes it likely that many slander actions will fail.84  
Even if the plaintiff could prove special damages, or that the alleged defamatory 
statement falls within a per se category, she could not prevail without proving in 
addition that the statement was defamatory in that it would tend to lower the 
plaintiff in the esteem of a “substantial and respectable minority” of the 
                                                
78. See Date-Bah, supra note 40 (citing JOHN MENSAH SARBAH, FANTI CUSTOMARY 
LAWS 113−14 (3d ed. 1968)). 
79. Literally, a stool is the seat of the Chief or other similarly placed individual who 
rules over a particular community.  It is a symbol of authority in Southern Ghana.  The 
Northern Ghana equivalent of a stool is the “skin.”  These concepts are often personified.  
Thus, land may be called stool land or skin land, meaning land belonging to the 
community.  The 1992 Constitution provides a definition for “stool,” though it is not a 
helpful one.  Article 295(1) defines stool as “includ[ing] a skin, and the person or body of 
persons having control over skin land.”  GHANA CONST. art. 295(1).  Thus, a stool or skin in 
one sense represents a person, or body of persons, who will have authority over skin land or 
stool land.  
80. See Date-Bah, supra note 40, at 143. 
81. One might, of course, contrast Ghanaian customary law with the common law of 
many other countries, or with the common law of Ghana itself.  The comparison with U.S. 
law was selected because of the authors’ greater familiarity with it.  There are great 
similarities between the English, Ghanaian and the American common law of torts, but we 
have not attempted to cover all bases. 
82. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text. 
83. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 408, at 1141–42 (2000) (“Slander per se 
is that which charges a (1) serious criminal offense or one of moral turpitude, (2) a 
‘loathsome’ and communicable disease, (3) any matter incompatible with business, trade, 
profession, or office, and sometimes, (4) serious sexual misconduct.” (footnotes omitted)). 
84. See id. 
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community.85  The alleged defamatory statement must allege actual facts that 
would be “reasonably believable.”86  Even if slander per se is alleged and the other 
elements of the common law case are proven, a plaintiff in the U.S. may be 
required to meet the very demanding “actual malice” standards imposed by New 
York Times v. Sullivan87 or Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.88  For the plaintiff who 
navigates these obstacles, recovery is possible, and potentially large, particularly 
if the plaintiff can demonstrate that the statement fell within a slander per se 
category.89   
 Some statements that fall within the boundaries of Ghanaian customary 
law certainly could also be litigated as common law claims in the U.S. or in 
Ghana, but many could not.  Calling a woman a “prostitute” clearly impugns 
chastity or sexual mores,90 and hooting out an allegation of theft qualifies as an 
accusation of a crime of serious moral turpitude.91  However, at least in modern 
common law jurisprudence, comments charging a person of being a “slave,” 
“crazy,” or “useless” are unlikely to be viewed as potentially slanderous or 
believable and would more probably be considered abuses  merely uttered to blow 
off steam that do not support a claim.92  Even if a claim can be stated, the 
complexity of common law defamation actions93 usually necessitates that the 
plaintiff retain an attorney, thus posing an additional barrier to recovery. 
 Under U.S. law, another way to approach some of the insults for which 
customary law allows recovery94 would be to frame them as claims for intentional 
                                                
85. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. e (1977); see also id. § 403, at 
1127. 
86. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (affirming Court of 
Appeals ruling that ad parody of plaintiff was not reasonably believable and hence libel 
claim must be dismissed). 
87. See 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (requiring proof of knowledge of falsity or reckless 
disregard for truth in a case brought by a public official). 
88. See 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (private plaintiff must prove fault to recover actual 
damages, and knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth to recover presumed and 
punitive damages). 
89. See, e.g., Purgess v. Sharrock, 33 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 1994) (anesthesiologist 
awarded $3,500,000 when defamation by employer caused him to lose job); United Ins. Co. 
of Am. v. Murphy, 961 S.W.2d 752 (Ark. 1998) (insurance agent awarded $600,000 in 
action against her employer); see generally Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Excessiveness or 
Inadequacy of Compensatory Damages for Defamation, 49 A.L.R.4th 1158 (1986). 
90. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 574 cmt. b. 
91. See id. § 571. 
92. See id. § 566 cmt. e. 
93. See DOBBS, supra note 83, § 401, at 1119–20. 
94. Ghanaian customary law recognizes the interest in compensating for hurt 
feelings.  For instance, in Wankyiwaa v. Wereduwaa, the defendant spoke and published a 
statement about the plaintiff that “her vagina stinks.”  The plaintiff brought an action in 
slander for damages.  Affirming a judgment in her favor, the High Court, per Justice 
Apaloo, stated: “In this country, where words of abuse are taken seriously, it would, in my 
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infliction of emotional distress.95  Although under U.S. law this tort is intended to 
be very narrow, in keeping with the courts’ suspicion of pure emotional injuries, it 
also has the potential to be quite broad.  The narrowness of the tort is evident in 
cases that refuse to impose liability for insults, even when the insults consist of 
racial epithets of the worst kind.  The Restatement (Second) makes a distinction 
between words that are “merely offensive” or “mere insults” that must be endured 
in our rough and tumble society and conduct that is “extreme and outrageous,” or 
beyond that which is tolerable in a civilized society.96  To Ghanaians living under 
the customary rules, the dichotomy between “extreme and outrageous conduct” 
and “mere insults” does not make sense.97  Calling an African-American one of 
the most insulting epithets possible to utter would surely be on par with calling 
someone a slave, yet, in the U.S., it is rarely actionable standing alone.98  
Although U.S. torts scholars, such as Richard Delgado99 and Jean Love,100 have 
criticized the narrowness of the U.S. approach and explained the harm to 
plaintiffs, the courts have not been persuaded.  In part, this is because of their 
belief that the First Amendment protects such speech, even if it is hurtful, and 
limits the state’s ability to protect the victims.101  
 Despite the narrowness of intentional infliction as it applies to insults, its 
breadth may allow it to encompass certain dignitary torts that injure the family, at 
least if they do not conflict with contrary law within the state.  As Daniel Givelber 
has argued, intentional infliction of emotional distress “provides no clear 
                                                                                                            
opinion, be socially intolerable if customary law provided no sanctions against a man who 
finds pleasure in injuring the feelings of his neighbour by vituperation. . . . [A]buse by itself 
is a wrong redressible by damages according to customary law.”  [1963] 1 G.L.R. 332 
(Ghana) (emphasis added).  
95. The elements are enumerated in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965), 
which provides: “(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or 
recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such 
emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.” 
96. See id. cmt. d. 
97. In the Ghanaian context, at least at the customary law level, no such distinction is 
made, although not every word of abuse is actionable.  See Wankyiwaa, [1963] 1 G.L.R. 
332.  
98. See DOBBS, supra note 83, § 305, at 830–31 (“Courts are clearly reluctant to 
impose liability for epithets, racial or otherwise, in the absence of repetition or aggravating 
factors.”). 
99. Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, 
and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982). 
100. Jean Love, Discriminatory Speech and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 123 (1990). 
101. See MARK A. FRANKLIN, ROBERT L. RABIN & MICHAEL C. GREEN, TORT LAW AND 
ALTERNATIVES 914–15 (8th ed. 2006). 
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definition of the prohibited conduct.”102  It does not objectively describe the acts 
intended to be encompassed within the tort, and thus “fails to provide clear 
guidance either to those whose conduct it purports to regulate, or to those who 
must evaluate that conduct.”103   
 Ironically, this lack of clarity has prompted plaintiffs, who are injured 
because a defendant has broken up their families, to attempt to redress the injury 
through the action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.104  The common 
law torts that used to address these family injuries directly were “criminal 
conversation,” which involved sexual intercourse by an outsider with a husband or 
wife, or “alienation of affections,” which occurred when outsiders tried to 
interrupt the relations among family members.105  While these torts were long 
recognized by the common law courts, more than half of the states in the U.S. 
have abolished them by judicial decision or statute.106  One court reasoned that the 
tort of criminal conversation was a means of exacting revenge and might ruin the 
defendant’s reputation.107  Further, the court believed that because the wrongful 
conduct involved sex, a tort action with its risk of damages liability would be 
unlikely to deter the defendant.108  Actions for breach of promise to marry109 and 
seduction110 have likewise been abolished in many places.  Thus, in the U.S., 
plaintiffs try, and a few succeed, in recasting these injuries to the family as 
intentional infliction of emotional distress cases.111  Many courts see these claims 
as efforts to circumvent the abolition of the family and relationship torts and do 
not permit them.112 
The case law makes it apparent that, whether denominated as alienation 
of affections, criminal conversation or intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
at least some people in the U.S. still perceive the need for redress in situations 
                                                
102. Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of 
Evenhandedness:  Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 
COLUM. L. REV. 42, 51 (1982). 
103. Id. 
104. See FRANKLIN, RABIN & GREEN, supra note 101, at 920–922; see also DOBBS, 
supra note 83, § 442, at 1245–49. 
105. See DOBBS, supra note 83, § 442, at 1246–47. 
106. See id. at 1247–48. 
107. See Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871 (Idaho 1994), cited in FRANKLIN, RABIN & 
GREEN, supra note 101, at 920–21. 
108. See id. 
109. RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 62:29 (4th ed. 2002). 
110. DOBBS, supra note 83, § 443, at 1249, 1252. 
111. Compare C.M. v. J.M., 726 A.2d 998 (N.J. Super Ct. Ch. Div. 1999) 
(recognizing intentional infliction claim for effect of wife’s adulterous affair on husband 
and children), with McDermott v. Reynolds, 530 S.E.2d 902 (Va. 2000) (rejecting 
intentional infliction claim on similar facts), and Bouchard v. Sundberg, 834 A.2d 744, 757 
(Conn. App. Ct. 2003) (rejecting claim).  
112. See, e.g., McDermott, 530 S.E.2d 902. 
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similar to those raised by the customary tort of seduction.113  It is unclear whether 
their reasons are actually retaliation and damages, as the courts suggest, or a 
desire for healing.  Unlike the situation in Ghana, it is unlikely that a judgment in 
favor of the plaintiff in the U.S. will restore the harmony of a family group, 
because litigation rarely has that effect.  However, the core desire to right the 
wrong committed to a family unit through tort is a commonality with Ghanaian 
customary law.  Many U.S. courts have chosen to view these injuries to the family 
unit as non-cognizable in tort, despite widespread acknowledgement of the injury 
in other contexts.114 
There is nothing in U.S. law that approximates the customary Ghanaian 
rule obligating a father to answer for the moral shortfalls of his son when the 
father has not properly arranged the young man’s marriage.  As a general rule, 
parents are not vicariously liable for the torts of their children.115  Children may 
hurt others through negligence or intentional torts, but while they may be held 
personally liable for the damages they inflict, the courts believe it would be highly 
unfair to impose the cost on the parents.116  Under the law of negligence, parents 
have affirmative duties to control or monitor the conduct of their children to 
prevent physical harms to others if the parents have both the ability to do so and 
knowledge of the need to do it.117  In such instances, the parents are held 
accountable for their own negligence.  It would be inconceivable to find parents at 
fault or vicariously liable for a child’s sexual dalliances.118  Children are expected 
to make their own way in the world as far as finding love and marrying, and it 
would be viewed as unjust to blame a parent for moral lapses of an unmarried son. 
With regard to remedy, it seems fair to say that the Ghanaian customary 
remedies are powerful, yet relatively gentle, while the U.S. common law remedies 
range from extremely harsh to non-existent.  Ghanaian jurist S.K. Date-Bah 
compared common and customary law remedies in the context of lawsuits for 
insult or slander and concluded that the customary remedies had distinctive 
advantages.119  Because damages are minimized in customary law, people have a 
                                                
113. See DOBBS, supra note 83, § 442, at 1245–49. 
114. See generally Paul R. Amato, The Consequences of Divorce for Adults and 
Children, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1269 (2000) (detailing the harmful effects divorce can 
have on all family members). 
115. See DOBBS, supra note 83, § 340, at 935; but see 59 AM. JUR. 2D PARENT AND 
CHILD § 103 (1987) (liability may be imposed in some instances by statute, for example, for 
vandalism, destruction of property or taking a vehicle without permission). 
116. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 123 (4th ed. 1971). 
117. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965). 
118. See, e.g., Bowen v. Mewborn, 11 S.E.2d 372, 374–75 (N.C. 1949) (rejecting 
argument that because the father gave his son “lustful and lascivious” advice he should be 
liable for his son’s sexual misconduct); see also Zapalski v. Benton, 444 N.W.2d 171 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (parents could not foresee sexual misconduct on the part of their 
child). 
119. See Date-Bah, supra note 40, at 139. 
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disincentive to sue for financial gain, or as Date-Bah puts it, to sell their good 
name for money.120  The common law remedies lack the public dimension of name 
clearing that accompanies the customary remedies.121  Many common law jurists 
would agree with Date-Bah’s critique of common law damages in defamation 
cases.122  It is frequently asserted that many plaintiffs want nothing more than to 
clear their names or to gain an apology, and it is difficult to do so.123  At the same 
time, in the rare instances where presumed damages are imposed, the common law 
rules have the potential to be economically burdensome.  This can even occur in 
situations where there is no culpability on the part of the defendant.124  
The common law rules pertaining to damages for intentional or negligent 
infliction of emotional distress generally require that the plaintiff plead and prove 
a specified level of harm.  In general, they require proof of “severe injury,” with 
some requiring evidence of actual physical injury in addition to the emotional 
harm.125  These requirements are in large part a response to the mistrust in the U.S. 
of the genuineness of emotional distress claims and the view that hurt feelings are 
not an injury worthy of the legal system’s intervention.  If a plaintiff cannot meet 
these harm thresholds, no remedy is available, even if the defendant’s conduct was 
intentionally hurtful.  Once again, this rule system stands in stark contrast to the 






                                                
120. See id.   
121. See id.; see also Janet Daniels, Protecting the Chastity of a Modest Matron, 1 
REV. GHANA L. 27, 31 (1973) (arguing that customary law would have provided a more 
reasonable result in a common law defamation suit brought against a university.  Daniels 
posits that the customary remedy would have allowed the plaintiff to salvage her honor 
while the university would not have been “mulcted” in damages.  Further, the customary 
remedy would have discouraged future litigation which, in the author’s view, did not 
advance women’s rights.). 
122. See, e.g., George E. Frasier, Note, An Alternative to the General Damage Award 
for Defamation, 20 STAN. L. REV. 504 (1968) (arguing that general damages neither 
adequately protect a plaintiff’s reputation, nor adequately promote the free flow of accurate 
information in media). 
123. See id. at 505 (arguing that money damages are ineffective in addressing injury to 
one’s reputation because money will not likely rehabilitate reputation and may actually 
harm the plaintiff, who will be seen as a “scoundrel concerned not with vindicating his 
reputation but with collecting a money judgment.”). 
124. See, e.g., Snead v. Redland Aggregates Ltd., 998 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(affirming jury verdict of $1 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages 
and concluding that the Constitution imposes no minimum standard of fault in private 
person/private concern libel cases). 
125. See DOBBS, supra note 83, § 306, at 832–33. 
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III. THE FUTURE OF GHANAIAN CUSTOMARY TORT 
 
 Ghanaian society today is more complex than in years past.  Its legal 
system must be responsive to a wide diversity of needs and traditions.  It must 
serve people in modern cities and rural villages who seek redress under both 
common and customary law principles.  The justice system utilizes the expertise 
of judges, who range from western-educated lawyers to traditional Chiefs who, 
with or without formal legal training, perform many dispute-resolution functions.  
It must serve not only English speakers, but individuals in many ethnic groups 
who prefer to speak in their mother tongues.  
As Ghanaians move from their traditional homelands to avail themselves 
of educational and employment opportunities, one wonders whether they will 
continue to abide by customary practices and seek customary law remedies for 
wrongs committed against them.  Many factors will likely influence the future of 
customary tort law.  One important consideration is the extent to which Ghana’s 
legal system, Constitution, laws, and other societal institutions protect and 
promote customary law.  As our analysis below demonstrates, the legal system is 
highly protective and affirmatively supportive of customary law.  The 1992 
Constitution ensures customary law a significant role in Ghanaian society for as 
long as Ghanaians continue to want it.  Thus, its future will depend on whether the 
Ghanaians will continue to seek recovery using customary tort law rather than 
availing themselves of common law torts, and whether courts will give effect to 
the customary practices.  
 
 
A. The Role of the Constitution, Laws, and Other Institutions 
  
The 1992 Constitution includes the rules of customary law as part of the 
laws of Ghana.126  Because of this, customary law is on a par with common law 
rules, statutes, and the Constitution itself,127 as well as other “existing law” as 
sources of law in Ghana.  In drafting the Constitution, the framers defined 
“existing law” to include the unwritten laws existing before the Constitution came 
into force.128  The inclusion of customary law and existing law in our view reflects 
the framers’ desire to recognize and protect the socio-cultural diversity of 
Ghanaian society, which includes no less than forty-six ethnic groups, each of 
                                                
126. See GHANA CONST. arts. 11(1)(e), (2); see also supra note 2 and accompanying 
text. 
127. Unless “customary practices . . . dehumanise or are injurious to the physical and 
mental well-being of a person,” in which case, they “are prohibited.”  GHANA CONST. art. 
26(2). 
128. See id. art. 11(4). 
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which has its own indigenous cultural norms, mores, and values that regulate 
social conduct and economic life.129  
 The Constitution of Ghana also gives every person the right “to enjoy, 
practise, profess, maintain and promote any culture, language, tradition or religion 
subject to the provisions of th[e] Constitution.”130  The regulation of the social life 
and conduct of the community through customary law is one way of expressing 
and professing cultural beliefs and practices; customary law is an expression of 
cultural beliefs and practices.  Any effort to affirmatively curtail the adherence to 
customary tradition and the reliance on customary law to enforce it would 
derogate the right to enjoy, practice, and profess one’s culture.  Of course, there 
are limits.  The Constitution provides that “[a]ll customary practices which 
dehumanise or are injurious to the physical and mental well-being of a person are 
prohibited.”131  This provision merely authorizes other Ghanaian institutions, such 
as the courts or the House of Chiefs, to invalidate a customary practice on a case-
by-case basis, and thus does not undermine the general applicability of customary 
law principles in Ghanaian society. 
 The Constitution of Ghana does more than protect the rights of 
Ghanaians to practice and enjoy their traditional ways.  Article 39 underscores the 
importance of traditional and indigenous norms by providing that “the State shall 
take steps to encourage the integration of appropriate customary values into the 
fabric of national life through formal and informal education and the conscious 
introduction of cultural dimensions to relevant aspects of national planning.”132  
Other provisions speak to the obligation of the State to foster development of 
Ghanaian languages and pride in Ghanaian culture,133 as well as to “ensure that 
appropriate customary and cultural values are adapted and developed as an 
integral part” of the needs of society and that traditional practices that are 
“injurious to the health and well-being of the person are abolished.”134  These 
affirmative obligations on the State ensure that customary practices will be taught 
and respected.  
 The institution of chieftaincy is protected by the Constitution,135 and 
chiefs are the repositories of customary law.136  Parliament is prohibited from 
making laws that “detract[] or derogate[] from the honour and dignity of the 
institution of chieftaincy.”137  Chiefs, along with their councils, serve important 
                                                
129. See Acquah, supra note 20; Ogwurike, supra note 16. 
130. GHANA CONST. art. 26(1).  Article 21(1)(b)–(c) provides for freedom of thought, 
conscience, and belief and freedom to practice any religion and to manifest such practice.  
See id. art. 21(1)(b)–(c). 
131. Id. art. 26(2). 
132. Id. art. 39(1).  A Ministry of Culture has been created to achieve these goals.  
133. See GHANA CONST. art. 39(3). 
134. Id. art. 39(2). 
135. See id. art. 270(1). 
136. See Acquah, supra note 20. 
137. GHANA CONST. art. 270(2)(b).  
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judicial and advisory functions in the community,138 such as the settlement of 
disputes, maintenance of peace and order, and championing development 
initiatives.  Today, even in urban environments, chiefs advise as to what custom 
and usage is and settle disputes between people.  The National and Regional 
Houses of Chiefs are also charged with the “study, interpretation and codification 
of customary law, with a view to evolving, in appropriate cases, a unified system 
of rules . . . and compiling the customary laws” and evaluating “those customs and 
usages that are outmoded and socially harmful.”139  
The constitutional provisions discussed above, the maintenance of the 
institution of Chieftaincy, and the creation of a whole ministry on culture make 
clear that customary law in general, and customary tort law in particular, are an 
important part of Ghana’s legal system.  The National House of Chiefs or the 
Regional House of Chiefs might decide to eliminate or consolidate certain 
practices, reducing the breadth of legally-accepted customary practices, but it 
appears unlikely that customary tort law will disappear altogether.   
 
 
B. The Role of the Courts 
  
Given the prominence of customary law in the Constitution and the 
support for it in institutions such as the various Houses of Chiefs, it is surprising 
how actively judges analyze and scrutinize customary tort law.  There have been a 
number of cases where Ghanaian judges have criticized customary tort principles.  
In one of the most famous, Nkrumah v. Manu,140 Justice Taylor was critical of the 
customary tort of slander and indicated he thought it was time that the law was 
changed.  He could see the rationale for it in the days when village communities 
were small and the spoken word was the only means of social or commercial 
communication.141  However, Taylor thought that in light of the drastic changes 
brought by modern civilization, Ghana had “more serious problems to tackle than 
silly vituperation.”142  Professor Date-Bah agreed with Taylor that the law should 
develop to deny Ghanaians civil remedies for insults.143  This view flew in the face 
of J.B. Danquah’s assertion in his book, Cases in Akan Law, that “[t]he delicate 
                                                
138. In the days before colonization, head chiefs, or kings, held power over their 
various indigenous states, and under them were chiefs of regional districts and villages.  
See Acquah, supra note 20.    
139. GHANA CONST. art. 272(b)–(c); see generally Chieftaincy Act, 1971, §§ 40–46 
(Ghana). 
140. [1971] 1 G.L.R. 176, 181–82 (Ghana). 
141. See id. at 181. 
142. Id. at 182.      
143. See S.K. Date-Bah, The Law of Slander in Ghana: A Sequel to Attiase v. 
Abobbtey, 3 REV. GHANA L. 164 (1971). 
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feelings of the average African are not half as blunted and atrophied as those of 
the average European . . . .”144  
While Justice Taylor’s view was that the law should not cater to the 
Ghanaians’ sensitive feelings, other judges have disagreed.  In Wankiyiwaa v. 
Wereduwaa,145 Justice Apaloo acknowledged that the offending statement was 
made to the plaintiff in anger and constituted plain vituperation, but stated: 
 
[t]he fact that the law of England provides no remedy is quite 
beside the point . . . . In this country, where words of abuse are 
taken seriously, it would in my opinion, be socially intolerable if 
customary law provided no sanctions against a man who finds 
pleasure in injuring the feelings of his neighbor by 
vituperation.146   
 
Similar disagreements emerged between judges with respect to the 
customary law rule holding a father liable for his son’s misconduct with a woman.  
In one case, Justice Edusei stated that it was against good conscience to permit 
this custom to exist, 
 
[in] present times, when present-day children are asserting their 
freedom of action and thought in diverse ways.  If the son is old 
enough to know what is sex, and in these days when there is 
nothing esoteric about sex, I cannot see by what stretch of legal 
ingenuity a parent should be saddled with his son’s 
irresponsibility.147  
 
Another Ghanaian judge reached the opposite conclusion in a case 
decided the same year.  Justice Wiredu acknowledged that: 
 
it is an undeniable fact that the present days’ events cannot be 
said to be the same as in the past when any talk of free love was 
intolerable, sex by the youth . . . has become a common feature 
in our society and therefore justifies a call for a new look and 
consideration of this aspect of the custom . . . .148   
 
However, Justice Wiredu viewed disregard of the custom as a highly undesirable 
and also unjustifiable development.  In his mind, it would encourage parental 
                                                
144. J. B. DANQUAH, CASES IN AKAN LAW xxiii (1928).  
145. [1963] 1 G.L.R. 332 (Ghana) (the case in which the plaintiff was told that “her 
vagina stinks”). 
146. Id. at 335. 
147. Addae v. Asante, [1974] 2 G.L.R. 288, 291 (Ghana).  
148. Gyan v. Dabrah, [1974] 2 G.L.R. 318, 323 (Ghana). 
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abdication of a duty to control the moral conduct of children and encourage 
“unchecked moral degeneration of youth generally.”149  Thus, even considering 
the custom in a modern context, Justice Wiredu came out in its favor. 
Ghanaian judges, then, have shown a willingness to rethink and 
reevaluate issues of customary law despite the prominence and protection it 
enjoys in the current and previous constitutions of Ghana.  They have declared 
that a customary law permitting trespass on tenants’ land and the cutting of palm 
trees was unenforceable, asserting that “[w]e cannot imagine an arrangement more 
ruinous of agricultural enterprise, subversive of expansion and consequently 
prejudicial to national development . . . .”150  They have also been willing to 
invalidate a custom that discriminates solely on the basis of sex, such as a rule 
forbidding a woman from succeeding to her father’s property because succession 
was patrilineal.151  But it is likewise clear that they have disagreed with one 
another as to whether it is appropriate to disregard a custom, such as destruction 
of crops, when it does not constitute a serious offense.  In one case, the High 
Court opined that even if a custom might appear to conflict with the common law 
or appear to be contrary to public policy or to lack a clear moral objective, a court 
should be slow to reject it or suggest a change.152  
Perhaps the internal conflict is best summed up by the fact that two years 
after he had agreed with Justice Taylor that Ghanaians should no longer be able to 
bring suit for insults and vituperation, S.K. Date-Bah thought better of his views, 
and in a subsequent article, he questioned whether it is “unenlightened for the law 
of torts to provide a remedy against abuse,” and whether it is “permissible to use 
the law of torts to change a particular feature of the mores of the Ghanaian 
community.”153  On the merits of the question, he noted that refusing to provide a 
remedy for insult will not necessarily make Ghanaians less sensitive to it.  “It may 
merely lead to insulted Ghanaians taking the law into their own hands or at least 
speaking ill of the law for not giving just redress to their felt grievances.”154  
In sum, notwithstanding the fact that the customary law is part of the 
laws of Ghana under the 1992 Constitution, Ghanaian judges sometimes 
encounter difficulty when asked to decide cases where customary law controls.  
They may disagree with one another as to the scope of their authority to decide 
whether to enforce customary law in the face of a challenge that it violates the 
Constitution.  As one Ghanaian Supreme Court justice observed, there is an 
enormous difference between the judges and the communities in which they sit, 
                                                
149. See id. at 323–24. Justice Wiredu’s position is consistent with current Ghanaian 
statutory law; see e.g., Children’s Act, 1998 (Act 560), § 6(3)(a)(b) (recognizing a parent’s 
duty to protect a child from “neglect, discrimination, violence, abuse, exposure to physical 
and moral hazards and oppression.”).   
150. See Attah v. Esson, [1976] 1 G.L.R. 128, 132 (Ghana). 
151. See Akrofi v. Akrofi, [1965] G.L.R. 13 (Ghana). 
152. See Abaye v. Akotia, [1982–1983] G.L.R.D. 109 (Ghana). 
153. Date-Bah, supra note 40, at 133.  
154. Id.  
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both in terms of education and socio-economic class.155  To the extent that 
customs differ from one ethnic community to another, full-blown choice of law 
issues must be resolved.  Yet, despite the challenges, a homogeneous English 
common law of torts would not do justice to the ethnic diversity of Ghana.156  




C. The People 
 
 As it stands now, Ghanaian citizens may be the ones with the most 
influence over the application of customary tort law in the future.  Its future 
depends on the desire of citizens to invoke its protections and embrace its values.  
Several factors can be identified as potentially undermining the hold of customary 
tort law in Ghana.  First, the prevailing religions in Ghana may influence what 
people perceive as offensive and whether they seek to recover for it.  Ghana is a 
largely Christian country, with a Muslim minority.  There are also a significant 
number of Ghanaians who believe in and practice a traditional African system of 
worship and belief.  Neither Christianity nor Islam sanctions the belief in 
witchcraft and wizardry, but traditional religions do.  It may be that, in the future, 
people will find it preposterous to seek relief under the customary tort of slander 
for being called witches or wizards because they have ceased to believe in 
witchcraft.  
 Second, as Ghanaians attend school and attain higher education, they 
may reject traditional Ghanaian practices.  This is particularly so as most educated 
Ghanaian men and women tend to be Christian or Muslim.  Their education, 
combined with their belief system, may well diminish the customary law tradition.  
It may also be that changes in the structure of society will fragment customary 
practice.  Although the institution of Chieftaincy is still vibrant, there may come a 
                                                
155. See Mobido Acran, The Clash of Legal Cultures: The Treatment of Indigenous 
Law in Colonial and Post-Colonial Africa, 39 AKRON L. REV. 465, 479 (2006) (noting that 
many of the judges are western-educated and not particularly well-grounded in customary 
law). 
156. See S.Y. Bimpong-Buta, Customary Mores and the Sale of Photographs of a 
Married Woman, 5 REV. GHANA L. 23–27 (1973) (“Just as customary rules as to 
inheritance and succession governing every citizen in Ghana depend upon the tribe or 
society to which that person belongs, so it is that each tribe or society in Ghana has its own 
beliefs and estimation as to what constitutes [a tort].”). 
157. South African judges are facing similar challenges to those faced by the 
Ghanaian judges because it has only been in the post-apartheid period that they have been 
authorized to apply customary law.  See T. W. Bennett, Re-introducing African Customary 
Law to the South African Legal System, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 5 (2009) (critiquing some of 
the South African decisions applying customary law). 
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time when even the Chiefs cannot give a good reason why a rule is in place, and if 
this is so, people may not be willing to follow it.  This would seem to be true, for 
example, with customs permitting trespass and destruction of property.  
 Finally, the fact that Ghana has a robust common law system clearly will 
have some impact on the invocation of customary law rights and remedies.  While 
some of the customary torts clearly fall outside of the common law rules, people 
may choose to avail themselves of the common law causes of action when they 
have a choice, particularly if the remedies are more generous in terms of damages.  
 Although all these factors may dissuade people from invoking customary 
law, there are still many reasons for customary law to continue.  The corporate 
and group nature of the Ghanaian descent system, the communal aspect of 
Ghanaian culture, the role of the family, and the role of customary law in 
maintaining the structure of society are fully intact in Ghana and not likely to 
change soon.  Customary law is still more inclusive than the common law in its 
vision of what constitutes a “wrong” and more generous with respect to remedies.  
To the extent that the Chieftaincy institution and other traditional institutions 
perform their duties properly, these cases will not need to be brought to courts.  
The use of Chiefs as part of the dispute resolution process, along with community 
tribunals where no legal representation is needed, makes customary torts an 
accessible and practical way to solve problems.  All of these factors suggest that 
Ghanaians will continue to utilize their customary torts. 
 
 
IV. OUR INDIVIDUAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
A. Ghanaian Perspective 
 
As a Ghanaian and a member of the Konkomba ethnic group, I grew up 
in a typical rural village, Dagbanjado, in the Northern Region of Ghana, where 
customary law was the only normative system that maintained and regulated 
social life and relations.  The principles that underlie customary tort law were 
ingrained in me very young.  I was taught not to undermine the name and dignity 
of the family.  I witnessed forms of social control, such as the public singing of 
the name and offense of a person who stole something, that were very effective in 
preventing departure from customary norms.  Thus, my perspective on customary 
tort law is colored not only by legal analysis but also by my life experience.  I 
firmly believe in the continued importance of customary law to Ghanaian society. 
The law, whether embodied in statute or case law, sets a minimum rule of 
conduct.  The decorum, peace, and stability of every human society—developed 
and underdeveloped—depends on the existence of certain norms, values, or shared 
expectations, and indeed a collective conscience that go beyond the confines of 
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codified law or judicial decisions.158  In other words, values, norms, and standards 
beyond statute or common law are a functional prerequisite for an orderly, 
predictable, and stable society.  This is particularly important in a society such as 
Ghana where the values and normative systems are ethnically diverse and this 
diversity is cherished and upheld. 
As our analysis above demonstrates, there are many types of conduct 
which may injure members of the community or society either as individuals or as 
a group for which there is no common law or statutory remedy.  The relevance of 
Ghanaian customary law then lies in the fact that it provides relief and remedies 
where individuals or groups who feel injured in one way or the other would 
otherwise have had no such relief or remedy.  Further, its importance lies in the 
fact that it emphasizes that which binds and holds people together, rather than 
what pulls them apart.  This is not surprising given the corporate nature of the 
descent groups in Ghana.  
In Nkrumah v. Manu,159 one of the now classic cases on the customary 
tort of slander, Justice Taylor’s opinion expressed the view that customary law 
had become irrelevant in modern civilization.  He stated:  
 
I must say though that it is about time the customary law of 
slander took on a more enlightened garb and moved so to speak 
with the demands of modern times.  When village communities 
were small and the written word was unknown to customary law 
the only means of social and commercial intercourse was the 
spoken word.  It was therefore essential for the preservation of 
the peace of those small communities that idle insults which 
ridicule and may therefore ruin a person be discouraged by the 
body politic.  With the very drastic changes which modern 
civilization has imposed on community and rural life throughout 
                                                
158. As early as 1935, McCardie, J., observed the limitation of statute law and judicial 
decisions in the case of marital life as follows:   
 
I should like to add three things, in view of several questions raised in 
the speeches or arguments of counsel.  Firstly, it seems to be clear that 
the position as between husbands and wives and third parties calls for 
reconsideration by the law in view of the new status of married women.  
Secondly, the rights of a married woman to form her independent 
friendships and enjoy her own amusements can never be solved by the 
law but must be determined by the standards of loyalty, of courtesy, and 
of good sense; and, thirdly, that the comfort and happiness of married 
life rests not on statutes or decisions but on matters that lie beyond and 
above the realm of law.  
Place v. Searle, [1932] 2 K.B. 497, 510. 
159. [1971] 1 G.L.R. 176 (Ghana).  
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the country it seems to me that the law has more serious 
problems to tackle than silly vituperation.160  
 
Agreeing with Justice Taylor, Professor Date-Bah observed that the more salutary 
course is for the law to develop along lines aimed at promoting greater tolerance.  
In his view, life in a democratic community demands a high degree of tolerance 
and it is desirable on policy grounds that attempts are made to blunt the unduly 
sensitive feeling of the average Ghanaian towards insults by denying him a civil 
remedy for mere vituperation.  Professor Date-Bah noted where the insult is such 
as is likely to lead to a breach of the peace, the law may intervene through the 
criminal law.  But where the criminal law test is not satisfied, the law should not 
grant damages to an insulted party merely to assuage his feelings.161   
In my view, both Justice Taylor and Professor Date-Bah were wrong in 
their rejection of the customary tort of slander.  Justice Taylor’s reference to the 
imposition of changes by modern civilization is problematic.  He seemed to 
suggest that the sensibilities of Ghanaians as to what amounts to intolerably 
offensive conduct or comments as defined by the community should be discarded 
as a result of changes imposed by modern civilization.  What “civilization” was he 
writing about and whose civilization is it?  In any case, if those changes 
“imposed” by modern civilization are indeed an imposition, why should 
                                                
160. Id. at 181–82. 
161. See Date-Bah, supra note 143.  Professor Date-Bah later doubted his own 
position.  In a subsequent article, Date-Bah seemed to contradict himself when he said:  
 
[T]he present writer believes that the law may be used in all its 
branches as a legitimate instrument of social change.  Where such 
social change requires changes in community values, it is again thought 
that the law is a legitimate instrument to employ.  However, though 
legitimate, it will not always be an efficacious instrument.  The view is 
probably least efficacious as an instrument of change where it is 
seeking to overturn age-old community values.  Where such values are 
sought to be changed, other more directly educational institutions such 
as the formal schools, the churches, the individual family units in 
which young children are socialised, etc. may be more important agents 
of change than a changed legal rule.  A point that may therefore be 
made in response to Taylor J.’s dictum is that refusing to provide a tort 
remedy for insult will not necessarily make Ghanaians less sensitive to 
insult.  It may merely lead to insulted Ghanaians taking the law into 
their own hands or at least speaking ill of the law for not giving just 
redress to their felt grievances. 
Date-Bah, supra note 40.   
And he admitted at footnote 10 that:  “The present writer wrote approvingly of Taylor 
J.'s criticism in (1971) 3 R.G.L. 164, esp. at p. 167, but is now not so sure whether he ought 
to have been so approving.”  Id.  
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Ghanaians give up their ways of life in the name of such so-called “modern 
civilization?”  
Further, although I agree with Professor Date-Bah that tolerance is an 
admirable value in a society, the desire for tolerance does not and should not mean 
that members of the community should discard and disregard legitimate claims as 
defined by their communities that are, or should be, remediable.  What is defined 
as slanderous at customary law is defined not by the individual, but by the 
community; the collective sense of what is wrong and unacceptable cannot be 
discarded in the name of modernization.  Professor Date-Bah’s willingness to 
relinquish the realm of customary law to criminal law represents too narrow a 
view of societal wrongs.  What may offend the collective conscience may not 
amount to a breach of peace, and if a breach of peace were to be used as the basis 
for liability, many defamatory wrongs would go unredressed.  If the people decide 
to maintain their values and normative system in the face of modernization, those 
values and normative system should be respected.  
In my view, the people who practice the particular customary beliefs and 
practices are the lawmakers, and their practices should be deferred to in most 
instances.  Those who can change or “amend” customary law are the very people 
who practice the particular custom.  Not even Parliament may intervene, unless 
customary practices “dehumanise or are injurious to the physical and mental well-
being”162 or the health of a person,163 in which case a judge may declare the 
particular custom null and void.  Absent apparent contradiction with the 
constitutional provisions, a judge in Ghana has no basis for reducing customary 
practices to a nullity.  In a number of the cases cited above, the decisions of the 
judges did not meet this yardstick.  The judges tended to base their decisions on 
what they perceived ought to be the law in the light of social change rather than 
what the law is.  They overlooked the important role customary law still plays as 
the normative base binding together Ghanaian society in so many parts of the 
country. 
Notwithstanding my criticism of certain decisions, I recognize and 
admire the questions these judges have asked about the place of customary tort 
law in an evolving society.  The structure of the Ghanaian legal system invites and 
indeed requires judges who are fully versed in the common law tradition and in 
customary law, and this is no small task for some.  No doubt the debate will 
continue, and I hope that Ghanaians will pursue it with full understanding of the 
role of customary law generally and customary torts in particular in Ghanaian 
society. 




                                                
162. See GHANA CONST. art. 26(2).  
163. See id. art. 39(2).  
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B. American Perspective 
  
My perspective on customary tort law in Ghana is that of an outsider; 
therefore, I cannot suggest whether it should thrive or perish in the future.  
Although I have no vested interest in Ghanaian customary tort law, I believe 
Ghana’s experiences hold many useful lessons relevant both to the role of 
customary law and to torts in particular.  First, customary tort law allows us to 
examine in a new context many of the issues that U.S. torts scholars think about 
on a regular basis.  One of these issues is how we conceive of injury for purposes 
of defamation and other dignitary torts.  The breadth of Ghanaian customary law 
makes the distinctions between insults and defamation seem insignificant, blurring 
the validity of the careful and arcane lines we tend to draw in the British and 
American common law tradition.  While our society is not organized in a manner 
that allows words to undermine an entire clan, the Ghanaians’ willingness to 
accept and redress this type of injury gives credibility to the claim that perhaps we 
have understated the injuriousness of certain courses of conduct by excluding 
them from the tort system. 
 The existence of a remedial alternative to courts, administered cheaply 
and without great societal cost or legal representation, is also instructive.  In 
essence, the remedies of the justice system are always at hand, and a departure 
from that model would seem to be a loss for the Ghanaians.  In many torts 
disputes, from defamation to medical malpractice, it has been observed that 
sometimes all that is really desired is a simple remedy: an apology or a 
clarification.  The American system is woefully inadequate to provide those 
remedies. 
Turning to insights about customary law more generally, Ghana is 
noteworthy in its commitment to the retention of its customary law and its 
development of institutions that can monitor the course the law takes in the future.  
There are inevitable tensions between modern concepts such as non-
discrimination on the basis of sex164 and strong gender roles in customary 
practice.165  It will be a challenge for Ghanaian courts and institutions, such as the 
                                                
164. Various international laws require that Ghana treat women as equals of men.  See 
Fenrich & Higgins, supra note 32, at 264–68.  Ghana’s domestic law also makes this 
commitment.  See id. at 285–94. 
165. Ghanaian customary law is not uniformly male-focused.  Some ethnic groups, 
such as the Akan, are matrilineal.  See id. at 270.  However, some scholars have argued that 
customary laws relating to marriage and family rights confer asymmetrical rights and 
obligations, with benefit tilting toward males.  See id. at 274–82.  Others argue that as legal 
reforms affecting the status of women have taken place, the policy makers confront 
pressure from certain, often elite, constituents, as well as from other countries, to adopt 
changes that will modify the traditional gender roles.  They often also face resistance to 
these changes from the rural population that adheres to these ideas and structures.  See 
Gwendolyn Mikell, Culture, Law, and Social Policy: Changing the Economic Status of 
Ghanaian Women, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 225 (1992) (arguing that women in developing 
332 Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law Vol. 26, No. 2 2009 
 
 
House of Chiefs, to continue to weave a legal tapestry that incorporates different 
world views, but their capacity to do so may well determine whether these two 
systems can continue to coexist in harmony. 
Finally, customary law plays a more important role in the geo-political 
landscape than many observers recognize.  Westerners are prone to suggesting the 
importance of exporting the “Rule of Law” (meaning common or civil law) to 
other countries and are often unlikely to recognize that customary law is in place 
and functioning.  In Afghanistan, for example, once one ventures outside of 
Kabul, customary law is used in tribal settings to resolve disputes.166  Countries 
such as Ghana that have given thoughtful attention to the role of customary law 
and its integration with other legal principles could be invaluable in providing 





Ghanaian customary tort law is a vibrant and living source of protection 
against the injuries that Ghanaians consider most serious: individual harm, social 
upheaval, chaos, and destruction of the family unit that anchors all of society.  Just 
as the common law changes through judicial accretions, at times reversing its 
conception of what constitutes an injury or whether a remedy ought to be 
awarded, Ghanaian customary law has the potential to change.  Although 
customary law is protected by the Constitution, laws and institutions of Ghana, the 
people who adhere to the norms and values embodied by customary law can 
change or reject it.  They may in time do so, if they begin to see some practices as 
contrary to their own interests.  But until that time, the judges and legislators who 
comprise Ghana’s legal establishment should respect customary practices.  These 
values and norms have sustained Ghana’s many ethnic groups through periods of 
enormous social and political upheaval; the purposes they serve are multi-faceted 
and important.  Just as common law tort principles provide a snapshot of society’s 
values, customary law principles reinforce the essence of Ghanaian diversity and 
                                                                                                            
countries can best improve their economic status through the development of local cultural 
organizations that do not come into conflict with cultural traditions). 
166. See Afghanistan: In Search of Justice: Rural Afghans Resistant to Official 
Judicial System (National Public Radio broadcast Dec. 17, 2008) (describing the authority 
of jirgas, or tribal councils, despite efforts to rebuild the country’s judicial system with the 
help of international aid), available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=98331042. 
167. George Ayittey suggests that the indigenous court system’s emphasis on 
reconciliation and the promotion of social harmony to resolve disputes and conflicts while 
seeking justice has worked so well that modern African societies ought to consider 
establishing an “international” court using those principles.  The history of strife between 
groups within a country and between African countries surely makes this suggestion 
worthy of serious consideration.  See AYITTEY, supra note 34, at 68–69. 
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ethnicity and the ethos of the multi-faceted groups that comprise the people of 
Ghana.  
 
 
 
 
